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Abstract 
Having combined data on Quebec scientists’ funding and journal publication, this paper tests the 
effect of holding a research chair on a scientist’s performance. The novelty of this paper is to use a 
matching technique to understand whether holding a research chair contributes to a better scientific 
performance. This method compares two different sets of regressions which are conducted on 
different data sets: one with all observations and another with only the observations of the matched 
scientists. Two chair and non-chair scientists are deemed matched with each other when they have the 
closest propensity score in terms of gender, research field, and amount of funding. The results show 
that holding a research chair is a significant scientific productivity determinant in the complete data 
set. However, when only matched scientists are kept in data set, holding a Canada research chair has a 
significant positive effect on scientific performance but other types of chairs do not have a significant 
effect. In the other words, in the case of two similar scientists in terms of gender, research funding, 
and research field, only holding a Canada research chair significantly affects scientific performance.  
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Introduction 
Scientists’ academic performance has been extensively discussed and many of its determinants are 
currently known as potential motives for publishing papers in peer-reviewed journals. Among others, 
age, gender, private and public funding, institutional setting, field and context are the most important 
determinants. Funding definitely plays a major role in knowledge production and in shaping scientific 
productivity: its positive effect on scientific productivity has been extensively demonstrated in the 
literature (Crespi and Geuna, 2008; Pavitt, 2000, 2001; Salter and Martin, 2001). 
The name and prestige of research centers may generally affect scientific productivity. For instance, 
Turner (2005) showed the outstanding research performance of ‘Grandes Ecoles’ in France. Beside 
the name and brand of academic institutions, centers with specific research orientations such as 
‘centers for excellence’ are also effective on the level of scientific productivity (Niosi, 2002). 
Other desirable factors, similar to ‘centers for excellence’, may increase an individual’s research 
motivation and influence the willingness or ability of a scientist for conducting original research. In 
this paper, we focus on the effect of holding a ‘research chair’ as a possible determinant of scientific 
publication. On the one hand, it may help the holder of this chair to be liberated from the constant 
quest for research funds or to have time to construct a more effective network, which may result in 
propelling future knowledge production. On the other hand, greater scientific productivity may 
simply be the effect of the past performance of a scientist, implying an intrinsic ability of scientists in 
conducting research and/or in mobilising effectively its extensive networking capacity. 
Using an appropriate econometric model, this paper tests whether ‘holding a chair’ has a significant 
effect on scientific productivity. The rest of paper is organised as follows: section 1 reviews the 
literature and proposes a theoretical framework that leads to two hypotheses. Section 2 explains how 
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data is gathered and describes the variables used in the econometric models. Section 3 presents the 
results of the regressions in regard to testing the hypotheses. Finally, section 4 concludes and 
summarizes the results of the paper. 
Section 1 - Theoretical framework 
The literature relevant to this article brushes on the importance of having a prestigious academic 
position or affiliation. Focusing on the role of university prestige in academic performance, Long et 
al. (1979) found a positive and significant correlation between the prestige of the scientist alma 
matter and the prestige of subsequent employment affiliation. The authors also indicated that 
graduating from a prestigious university has a positive effect on citations (but not on publication 
counts). The paper also provides a justification for the effect of prestige arguing that the best students 
are admitted to the most prestigious universities and subsequently the graduates of the prestigious 
universities are generally recruited by other similar institutions. Furthermore, such scientists who 
studied in and have been recruited by prestigious universities are better able to interact with new 
gifted students (Long et al., 1979). This paper argued that academic prestige can push forward 
research and its quality. More recently, Zhou et al. (2012) showed that papers cited by prestigious 
scientists, regardless of the number of citations, are of a higher quality than papers which are cited by 
‘ordinary’ scientists. 
Prestige can be seen from the reverse direction of causality. West et al. (1998) investigated the 
relationship between departmental climate, such as degree of formalization, support for career 
development and support for innovation on the one hand, and officially rated effectiveness of 
universities on the other hand. They conclude that the causality direction is from former to latter, 
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showing that the prestige of universities is an effect and not a cause for appropriate departmental 
climate and necessary institutional setting for conducting research. 
Measuring and quantifying prestige have been discussed in some articles. Frey and Rost (2010) 
compared three types of university ranking based on the number of articles, number of citations, and 
membership of editorial board or of academic associations. The authors indicated that these rankings 
are not compatible with each other and suggested the use of multiple measurements. Van Raan (2005) 
criticized the applicability of university rankings such as the Shanghai ranking for evaluating 
academic excellence by noting that the ‘affiliation’, as an important factor reflecting research 
atmosphere, is not well addressed in those ranking. In addition to the university ranking, it is 
important to assess individual research productivity to have a better sense of prestige. Henrekson and 
Waldenström (2007) introduced three types of indicators, measuring research performance: (1) 
measures based on weighted journal publications, (2) measures based on citations to most cited 
works, and (3) measures based on the number of publications. 
To measure prestige with a more robust measure, it is possible to consider awards as a measure of 
prestige, which is awarded based on a deliberate assessment in specialized and independent 
committees. Different types of research chairs are examples of awards. In Canada, there are three 
types of research chair: (1) research chairs which are awarded by industry and generally referred to as 
industrial chairs; (2) research chairs which are awarded by Canadian federal funding agencies such as 
the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) and the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR); and (3) the ‘Canada research chairs’, whose holders are assumed to already 
achieve research excellence in one of the main fields of research: engineering and the natural 
sciences, health sciences, humanities, and social sciences. The purpose of this latter program is to 
“improve […] depth of knowledge and quality of life, strengthen Canada’s international 
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competitiveness, and help train the next generation of highly skilled people through student 
supervision, teaching, and the coordination of other researchers’ work”1. Considering holding a chair 
as some kind of measure of prestige, we aim to elucidate the effect of being a ‘chair-holder’ on 
scientific productivity. Our first hypothesis therefore reads as: 
Hypothesis 1: Holding a chair increases a scientist’s performance measured in terms of number of 
publications. 
Hypothesis 1 tests the performance of chair-holders compared to other scientists and as such does not 
seek to prove causality. Considering the fact that chair-holders are the well-funded scientists too, this 
hypothesis cannot detach the funding effect of the chair from its other effects (mainly from prestige 
and networking effect). In other words, despite the evidence in literature about the benefits and goals 
of the research chair programs other than funding, hypothesis 1 is not able to disentangle them. 
A number of authors tried to highlight the functions and characteristics of research chairs. Cantu et al. 
(2009) showed the research chair program would be a good strategy for implementing knowledge-
based development. In study on German universities, Schimank (2005) argued that chair-holders are 
small businessmen with high job security and no bankruptcy in addition to a good level of freedom of 
teaching and research, indicating that research chairs have the characteristics of job security and 
sovereignty. 
According to official documents, influencing scientific productivity is not the direct goal of a research 
chair. In the tenth-year evaluation report for Canada research chair (CRC)2 programme, the authors 
conclude that CRC program is an effective way for Canadian universities to “attract and retain 
                                                 
1 http://www.chairs-chaires.gc.ca/about_us-a_notre_sujet/index-eng.aspx  
2 http://www.chairs-chaires.gc.ca/about_us-a_notre_sujet/publications/ten_year_evaluation_e.pdf 
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leading researchers” from other countries (page 4). The report does not say that holding a research 
chair is a determining factor of a chair’s scientific production: “the extent to which this success can 
be related directly to the CRC is difficult to quantify” (page 5). Furthermore, holding a research chair 
does not imply a higher salary. Courty and Sim (2012) showed that although having Canada Research 
Chair (CRC) initially increases the professors’ salary, such an increase erodes quickly over the time. 
This means that getting a research chair does not necessarily result in long-term salary jump.  
It is possible to look at the research chair as a result of scientists’ characteristics and achievements 
(for instance number of articles, and number of citations). A chair-holder may experience an effect 
specific to holding chair on his/her scientific production in addition to the contribution of his/her 
characteristics and past achievements. To disentangle the exclusive effect of chair from the effect of 
scientists’ characteristics, we propose our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Keeping a scientist’s main characteristics (gender, research field, and amount of 
grants) constant, holding a research chair does not have a significant positive effect 
on his/her scientific production. 
This hypothesis can be tested using a matching technique, which will be explained in the 
methodology section. In addition to our two hypotheses, a number of factors have been shown in the 
literature to influence research productivity. These will be used as control variables in our regression 
models. Among others, age, gender, funding, research field, and university characteristics are the 
most important determinants of scientific production which should be controlled when the effect of 
research chair on scientific productivity is being tested. 
In terms of age, two strands of the literature about its effect on scientific productivity are in 
opposition to one another. First, some authors argue for the life cycle trend in economic activity, 
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referring to the non-linearity of human productivity during life (Becker, 1962). Those articles show 
that productivity follows an inverted U-shape format (Kyvik, 1990; Kyvik and Olsen, 2008), which 
can be justified by the optimization of the trade-off between cost of human capital investment at a 
younger age and its return as a benefit at an older age. For instance, Bernier et al. (1975) showed an 
increase in quality and quantity of publications until the age of 44 and a fall after that age. The second 
strand of the literature generally finds that scientists’ academic performance (number of articles and 
number of citations) decreases with age (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003; Diamond, 1986; Levin and 
Stephan, 1991). 
Gender is also known as a significant determinant of scientific productivity in the literature. Nakhaie 
(2002) showed that Canadian female scientists have a lower scientific productivity compared to their 
male colleagues. Long (1990) explained that women’s opportunities for collaboration are 
significantly less than those of men’s because women have young children. However, in another 
study, Long (1992) showed that women are less productive in the first decade of their career but are 
more productive afterwards. Moreover, Xie and Shauman (1998) and Abramo et al. (2009) argue that 
gender differences in research productivity have declined over time, while at the same time the 
population of female scientists has proportionally increased. 
Research funding is another important determinant of scientific productivity. In a review article on 
the effect of funding, Salter and Martin (2001) suggested the following six types of contribution of 
publicly funded research: source of new useful knowledge, new instrumentation and methodologies, 
skills developed by those involved in carrying out basic research, expansion of national and 
international networks, dealing with complex problems3, and creation of spin-off companies. Pavitt 
                                                 
3 The paper argues that solving the complex problem provides great benefit for the firms and organizations facing such problems. 
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(2001) also referred to the importance of public support for scientific infrastructure development and 
highlights its role in the effectiveness of public grants. In another study, Pavitt (2000) argued that 
funding for infrastructure of expertise, equipment and networks is necessary for the development and 
implementation of research. 
Another body of literature investigates the effect of university characteristics on scientific 
productivity. Heinze et al. (2009) showed that the small size of a research group, sufﬁcient access to 
the various technical skills, and an appropriate leadership all result in an improvement in research 
productivity. Similarly, Carayol and Matt (2006) found that in a smaller laboratory, individual 
researchers publish more, compared with individuals working in a large laboratory. Other authors 
focused on the effect of faculty size. Buchmueller et al. (1999) indicated that graduate school faculty 
size is a significant determinant of the research proficiency of graduates. Jordan et al. (1988, 1989) 
suggested that research productivity is positively associated with department size but that the effect 
becomes weaker as the size increases. In contrast, Kyvik (1995) rejected both hypotheses that large 
departments are more productive and that faculty members of large departments better assess the 
research environment. 
In terms of university governance, Jordan et al. (1989) found significant evidence that private 
institutions have a greater average productivity, but Golden and Carstensen (1992) found no 
difference between public and private universities in terms of research productivity when controlling 
for research support from leading research foundations and department faculty rating. Golden and 
Carstensen argued that public and private institutions are solely different in a way that public 
institutions have a greater teaching load, which may affect scientific productivity. 
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Differences between fields and context are also noted by a number of authors. Blackburn et al. (1978) 
showed that the fields of humanities and sciences have different patterns of scientific production. To 
justify the differences between disciplines, Baird (1986) for instance showed that large research 
laboratories in chemistry, the scholarly apprenticeship approach in history, and research over practice 
in psychology are important field-dependent factors in scientists’ productivity. In another 
comprehensive study, Baird (1991) referred to the productivity and citation pattern differences among 
disciplines and argues that size, internal university support and federal support can explain such 
differences. The evidence from the literature clearly suggests that scientific productivity may depend 
on academic prestige and on other control variables such as funding, gender, age, and university-
specific characteristics. 
Section 2 - Data and methodology 
Data and variables 
In order to validate our two hypotheses, we built a data set based on the integration of data on funding 
and journal publications for Quebec scientists. For publications, Thompson Reuters Web of Science 
provides information on scientific articles (date of publication, journal name, authors and their 
affiliations). The dependent variable of our model therefore counts the yearly number of articles 
[nbArticle] published by an individual researcher in any given year. For each publication, the 
database also provides the number of co-authors. To control for team size, we therefore calculate the 
average number of co-authors [nbAuthors] over all the articles published by an individual researcher 
in any given year. 
In terms of funding, we use a database of Quebec university researchers (Système d’information sur 
la recherche universitaire or SIRU) gathered and combined by the Ministry of Education, Leisure 
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and Sports. This database lists the grants and contracts information, including yearly amount, source, 
and type for the period of 2000-2012 for all Quebec university scientists4 and the title of each specific 
research project for which funding was granted. The titles of research project are being used to 
generate dummy variables identifying whether a scientist has a research chair; the title field clearly 
states: “chair in…”. As mentioned above, three types of chair are available in Canada: (1) industrial 
research chairs [dIndChair]; (2) research chairs awarded by Canadian federal granting councils 
[dGCChair ]; and (3) Canada research chairs [dCRC ]. In addition, we created a dummy variable 
[dIndGCChair ] indicating whether the scientist is an industrial chair or a chair assigned by Canadian 
federal granting councils (the combination of dIndChair and dGCChair). Finally, the dummy variable 
[dChair] is equal to 1 for scientists with any type of chair (the combination of dIndChair, dGCChair, 
and dCRC). Appendix 1 reviews the names and description of the variables in the data set and 
appendix 2 summarizes the variables’ descriptive statistics. 
The next set of variables in the data set measures funding information. In terms of source, the 
research funding can be awarded by the public sector, the private sector, or organizations with social 
and political missions, which we classify as not-for-profit (NFP) organisations. Our research will 
concentrate on operational cost5 research funding to ensure that the three fields6 examined are more 
comparable – there is relatively little infrastructure investment in the humanities and social sciences 
compared to health sciences and the engineering and natural sciences. The three funding variables to 
                                                 
4 When the funding is attributed to more than one recipient researcher, the total amount of funding is divided by the number of 
researchers in the team within the same university. The SIRU data accounts for all interuniversity transfers and funds are counted where 
they have been transferred and spent. Unfortunately, we have no means by which to sum the funds from the same grants that are 
transferred to other universities, as the reporting does not allow a match between the data.  
5 Research funds may serve two purposes: they may be directly used for research cost and researchers’ salary as operational costs (O) or 
indirectly help research teams in buying instruments or laboratory infrastructure (I). It is therefore possible to generate six research 
funding variables for each researcher [PublicfundingO, PublicfundingI, PrivatefundingO, PrivatefundingI, NFPfundingO, and 
NFPfundingI]. In reality, research infrastructure funding stems mainly from public sources and the private and not-for-profit sources 
(PrivatefundingI, NFPfundingI) are too sporadic, i.e. rarely different from 0, to be used effectively in our models. 
6 We have three fields: ‘engineering and the natural sciences’, ‘health sciences’, and’ humanities, and social sciences’ 
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be considered are therefore [PublicfundingO, PrivatefundingO, and NFPfundingO] for the public, 
private and not-for-profits sectors respectively. The funding variables are measured in three-year 
averages to smooth out large variations in yearly funding.  
In addition, age and gender of scientist are also available in dataset [Age, dFemale] and provide 
useful controls for scientific productivity, as was highlighted in the theoretical framework. This 
information was disambiguated by the Observatoire des sciences et des technologies (OST) for all 
Quebec academics.  
Methodology and econometrics model 
To measure the effect of ‘holding a research chair’ on a scientist’s performance, we use a panel 
regression model where the left-hand-side (LHS) variable the number of articles [nbArticle] is a 
measure of scientific productivity. On the right-hand-side (RHS), the main independent variables are 
the research chair dummy variables described above [dIndChair, dGCChair, dCRC, dIndGCChair, 
dChair]. The other independent variables are our controls, among others age [Age], gender 
[dFemale], as well as funding, and are described in the next paragraphs. 
In terms of funding, this research only focuses on the effect of the operational budget because funding 
for the purpose of buying instruments or laboratory infrastructure does not have a regular pattern, 
implying that it depends on the research needs, field, and handiness of updated research instruments. 
Hence we only use the variables of operational costs [PublicfundingO, PrivatefundingO, 
NFPfundingO] to control for the effect of funding. We also measure the interactive effect of funding 
and holding a chair on scientific productivity in regression models to find out whether there is a 
difference between the funding effect of chair-holders and of non-chair-holders. 
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Age [Age] and its square are inserted in regression to investigate a non-linear effect of age on 
scientific productivity. We also control for university, year, and research division fixed effect in order 
to account for any impact that our explanatory variables may not cover. For example, McGill 
University and University of Montreal (UdeM) produce more scientific publications (figure 17). In 
terms of research divisions, Science, Engineering, Medical Science, and Health Science (figure 2) are 
more productive than others. We also add year dummy variables to account for year-specific 
characteristics of the research system as exemplified by the evolution of article counts over time 
(figure 3). 
 
Figure 1 – Trend of scientists’ number of articles in universities 
                                                 
7 The small universities are grouped according to their active disciplines and other institutional similarities. The University of Quebec 
and Bishop University are in the same group. The second group includes "École de technologie supérieure" (ETS), "Université du 
Québec à Montréal" (UQAM), and Institut national de la recherche scientifique (INRS). 
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Figure 2 – Trend of scientists’ number of articles in different divisions 
 
Figure 3 – Average number of articles in each year 
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The possible reason behind yearly differences is that science and research policies may change over 
time. Hence funding and institutional support may have different formats over the years. In addition, 
the norms and standards for publication and motivations for research are different across divisions 
and universities. University dummies and research division dummies may thus account for part of the 
impact on scientific productivity8. Considering the mentioned explanatory variables, the resulting 
model is given by9: 
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It is important to note that two variables [PublicfundingO] and [nbArticle] are determined by each 
other and co-evolve over time, which is a potential source of endogeneity. As a consequence, 
ordinary least square regressions (for panel data) are biased. The main reason for this potential 
endogeneity is that scientists are assessed for public funding based on their CV and past performance 
while at the same time, publication and research quality significantly depends on the funding 
available to researchers. We have also conducted Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity, in 
which the residuals of the endogenous right-hand side variable (as a function of all exogenous 
variables) are put in the original panel OLS model. By showing that the coefficient of the residuals is 
significant, it is possible to conclude about existence of endogeneity10. 
                                                 
8 The “Year 2000”, “McGill University”, and the research division of “Medical science” are selected as reference points and are thus 
the excluded dummy variables.  
9 It should be noted that variables measuring funding and number of articles are transformed by natural logarithm function to have 
normal distribution and satisfy the necessary conditions for running regression equations. 
10 The test is reported in the note of each regression table in section 3. 
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Using instrumental variables (IV) is a common suggested method in literature to address endogeneity 
problems. There are two main requirements for using IVs: (1) the instruments must be correlated with 
the endogenous variable, and (2) the instruments should not be correlated with the error term in the 
main regression equation, which means that the instruments must not suffer from the same 
endogeneity problem. If there is more than one instrument for an endogenous variable, it is necessary 
to perform a two-stage regression, in which the first stage estimates the endogenous variable (the 
instrumented variable) based on a list of instrumental variables and the independent variables of the 
second-stage regression. Such an estimation removes the error term of the first stage and keeps the 
estimated amount for the second stage. Neglecting the error term of the endogenous variable and 
putting the estimated amount in the main regression equation should generally solve the endogeneity 
problem. 
A number of instruments for the amount of public funding were tested during the course of this 
research and three were retained. The number of scientists in a university [nbScientistUni] is an 
indication of university size. It is expected that a university with a higher number of scientists may 
benefit from sharing of research costs and expenditures, which reduces the need for larger amounts of 
individual funding, hence benefitting from some kind of economies of scale. 
The rank of previous funding obtained by an individual scientist can predict the future amount of 
funding. We would call this an echo effect, indicating that highly funded scientists are better able to 
find new sources of research funds in the future. The rationale behind this argument is that successful 
researchers have an effective networking capacity (Winter et al., 2006) to generate and benefit from 
funding opportunities in a country such as Canada (Salazar and Holbrook, 2007). The difference 
between funding and rank of funding is that the rank of funding is just an ordinal variable and as such 
does not have information about amounts of funding (it meets the requirements of being an 
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instruments, benefit from the panel format of the data without imposing an autoregressive structure to 
the model), while the amount of funding is informative about capacity of conducting original 
research. Therefore, we can use the rank of funding as an instrument of funding amount. The rank of 
a scientist in his/her research division in terms of three-year average amount of funding for the 
purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure of research [PubORank] is the second instrument 
retained in this research. Using the same rationale we can use the rank of a scientist in his/her 
research division in terms of three-year average number of articles [PublRank] as the third 
instrument. Regarding the mentioned instruments, in the first stage, the amount of public funding 
[PublicfundingO] is estimated by the instruments with one-year lag to avoid simultaneity problems. 
Considering the mentioned explanatory variables, the resulting model is given by: 
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In a well-specified model, the RHS variables (including instrumental variables) should not be highly 
correlated with each other. The low correlation refers to good level of independence and explanatory 
power of RHS variables. The correlation matrix is reported as appendix 3 and the correlation 
coefficients are acceptable for estimating the regression equations and are thus appropriate choices 
from this point of view. 
The main purpose of this research is to show whether holding a research chair as an external support 
is important and significant in promoting scientific publication. To test the first hypothesis, it is 
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sufficient to run the two-stage panel regression on the entire data set to determine whether ‘holding a 
research chair’ is a significant RHS variable, either as a real cause or a channel for other 
variables/causes. 
According to the chair characteristics, the networking and prestige effect of ‘holding a research chair’ 
may be mixed with the effect of funding. To address this issue, we use a matching technique and 
compare two ‘chaired’ and ‘non-chaired’ scientists who have similar funding, the same gender, and 
work in the same research field as each other. Following the methodology employed by Bérubé and 
Mohnen (2009), it is possible to find pairs of chair-holders and non-chair-holders by using the 
psmatch2 command in Stata and then to remove the unmatched records. The selection is made by 
generating propensity scores and choosing the pairs of scientists with the closest scores to each other. 
The new data set consists of ‘twin’ scientists who are similar to each other in terms of funding, 
gender, and research fields. 
Controlling with funding, gender, and research field, and keeping only the matched scientists in the 
regressions allows to disentangle the prestige effect from the funding effect of the chair and hence, 
‘holding a research chair’ becomes a better and more informative signal for the prestige of scientists. 
In this case, the effect of ‘holding a chair’ on scientific productivity does not include funding effect or 
it is not related to the field or gender of the scientist. To test the second hypothesis, only matched 
pairs of scientists are being used in the regression analysis to identify whether holding a research 
chair has a significant effect on scientific productivity. 
One of the important stages of the matching technique consists in validating the quality of matching. 
This implies that there should be no difference between the averages of the selection criteria (gender, 
funding, and research fields) when the comparison is made between chair holders and non-chair 
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holders among the matched pairs. There can however be a difference when the comparison is made 
between the original database and the matched database. Table 1 summarizes these comparisons and 
shows that the matching is of acceptable quality for dCRC, dIndGCChair, and dchair. 
Table 1 – Mean comparison between holders and non-holders of chairs for the matched and non-matched samples to show the 
quality of the matching 
 
Gender Funding 
Field11 
Nb. of scientists 
 NSE Health 
dCRC=1 0.2000 $463,465  0.2779 0.1661 293 
dCRC=0 (before matching) 0.2963 $85,994  0.2516 0.2262 7356 
Significance level of difference12 *** *** >0.1 ***  
dCRC=0 (after matching) 0.1023 $403,051  0.3583 0.1808 293 
Significance level of difference *** >0.1 >0.1 >0.1  
      
dIndGCChair=1 0.1319 $351,835  0.743 0.0694 144 
dIndGCChair=0 (before matching) 0.2957 $95,728  0.2432 0.2268 7508 
Significance level of difference *** *** *** ***  
dIndGCChair=0 (after matching) 0.1111 $369,080  0.6944 0.0902 144 
Significance level of difference >0.1 >0.1 >0.1 >0.1  
       
dchair=1 0.1809 $420,693  0.4238 0.1357 418 
dchair=0 (before matching) 0.2991 $81,953  0.2427 0.229 7231 
Significance level of difference *** *** *** ***  
dchair=0 (after matching) 0.1483 $364,117  0.4880 0.1770 418 
Significance level of difference >0.1 >0.1 >0.1 >0.1  
 
Section 3 - Result and discussion: 
Based on the models presented in methodology section, we first need to estimate the regressions on 
the entire dataset (tables 2, 3, and 4) to show that all types of chair have a positive and significant 
effect on scientific productivity. Then, after keeping only the matched scientists in the dataset, who 
are similar to each other in terms of gender, funding, and research field, the regression results indicate 
                                                 
11 The matching is done based on the dummy variables of NSE (Natural Science and Engineering) and HEALTH 
(Medical and Health Science). The third dummy is considered as the reference point. 
12 To find out whether two variables are indifferent, we validated three null hypotheses: inequality, greater amount, 
smaller amount. If any of the hypotheses is validated at 1%, then we can say that the difference is significant at the level 
of 1% (***). Otherwise, the difference is not significant. 
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a significant and positive result only for the Canada research chair (tables 5, 6, and 7). Industrial 
chairs and chairs appointed by Canada research council (NSERC, SSHRC, and CIHR) do not have an 
independent positive effect on scientific productivity. However holding any kind of research chair 
[dChair] still has significant and positive effect mainly due to higher number of Canada research 
chairs included in the dChair dummy variable. 
 
Table 2 – Regression results over the entire sample and using dCRC (the second stage of 2SLS) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0227 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0211 *** 0.0211 *** 0.0083 *** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0085 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0094 *** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0059 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0066 *** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
dFemalei -0.0591 *** -0.0546 *** -0.0499 *** -0.0548 *** -0.0506 *** -0.0666 *** 
 (0.0076)  (0.0075)  (0.0076)  (0.0075)  (0.0076)  (0.0071)  
Ageit -0.0054 ** -0.0038 * -0.0039 * -0.0038 * -0.0039 * 0.0049 *** 
 (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  
Ageit2 3.30E-05 * 2.00E-05  2.10E-05  2.10E-05  2.10E-05  -1.10E-04 *** 
 (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (1.7E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.4656 *** 0.4654 *** 0.4654 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4855 *** 
 (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  
dCRCit   0.2449 *** 0.2760 *** 0.2021 *** 0.2321 *** 0.2414 *** 
   (0.0173)  (0.0192)  (0.0192)  (0.0213)  (0.0198)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     -0.1529 ***   -0.1358 *** -0.1311 *** 
     (0.0420)    (0.0420)  (0.0393)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      0.0114 *** 0.0108 *** 0.0095 *** 
       (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0021)  
Constant 0.0236  -0.0166  -0.0152  -0.0156  -0.0143  0.0406  
 (0.0557)  (0.0554)  (0.0554)  (0.0553)  (0.0553)  (0.0483)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  88422  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  7660  
χ2 40352.2 *** 41196 *** 41247 *** 41369.1 *** 41398.8 *** 47253.6 *** 
R2 within groups 0.1854  0.1868  0.1868  0.1866  0.1867  0.2079  
R2 overall 0.5456  0.5503  0.5505  0.5509  0.5511  0.5512  
R2 between groups 0.7631  0.7681  0.7684  0.7692  0.7695  0.7562  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 10.55, and 12 respectively. The 
amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 4901.85 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 3 - Regression results over the entire sample and using dIndGCChair (the second stage of 2SLS) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0227 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0087 *** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0085 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0097 *** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0059 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0067 *** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
dFemalei -0.0591 *** -0.0591 *** -0.0580 *** -0.0591 *** -0.0580 *** -0.0736 *** 
 (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0077)  (0.0076)  (0.0077)  (0.0071)  
Ageit -0.0054 ** -0.0054 ** -0.0054 ** -0.0054 *** -0.0054 ** 0.0038 ** 
 (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  
Ageit2 3.30E-05 * 3.30E-05 * 3.20E-05  3.30E-05 * 3.30E-05 * -1.04E-04 *** 
 (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (1.7E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.4656 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4870 *** 
 (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  
dIndGCChairit   0.1084 *** 0.1207 *** 0.0762 ** 0.0886 *** 0.1157 *** 
   (0.0247)  (0.0264)  (0.0330)  (0.0343)  (0.0318)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.0935    -0.0926  -0.1187 * 
     (0.0704)    (0.0704)  (0.0657)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      0.0043  0.0043  0.0048 * 
       (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0027)  
Constant 0.0236  0.0281  0.0275  0.0294  0.0288  0.0810  
 (0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0485)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  88422  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  7660  
χ2 40352.2 *** 40397 *** 40403.2 *** 40426 *** 40431.8 *** 46374 *** 
R2 within groups 0.1854  0.1856  0.1856  0.1857  0.1857  0.2083  
R2 overall 0.5456  0.5460  0.5460  0.5461  0.5461  0.5464  
R2 between groups 0.7631  0.7633  0.7634  0.7634  0.7635  0.7491  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 10.55, and 12 respectively. The 
amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 5114.92 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 4 - Regression results over the entire sample and using dChair (the second stage of 2SLS) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0227 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0082 *** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0085 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0089 *** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0059 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0065 *** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
dFemalei -0.0591 *** -0.0554 *** -0.0505 *** -0.0557 *** -0.0512 *** -0.0669 *** 
 (0.0076)  (0.0075)  (0.0077)  (0.0075)  (0.0077)  (0.0072)  
Ageit -0.0054 ** -0.0040 * -0.0041 ** -0.0041 ** -0.0042 ** 0.0046 ** 
 (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  
Ageit2 3.30E-05 * 2.10E-05  2.20E-05  2.20E-05  2.20E-05  -1.09E-04 *** 
 (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (1.7E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.4656 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4660 *** 0.4659 *** 0.4856 *** 
 (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  
dChairit   0.2091 *** 0.2315 *** 0.1761 *** 0.1985 *** 0.2112 *** 
   (0.0147)  (0.0162)  (0.0170)  (0.0185)  (0.0172)  
dChairit*dFemalei     -0.1207 ***   -0.1099 *** -0.1132 *** 
     (0.0367)    (0.0368)  (0.0344)  
dChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      0.0071 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0066 *** 
       (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  
Constant 0.0236  -0.0024  -0.0015  0.0025  0.0031  0.0551  
 (0.0557)  (0.0554)  (0.0553)  (0.0553)  (0.0553)  (0.0483)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  88422  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  7660  
χ2 40352.2 *** 41140 *** 41180.3 *** 41243.4 *** 41269.6 *** 47152.8 *** 
R2 within groups 0.1854  0.1870  0.1870  0.1870  0.1870  0.2082  
R2 overall 0.5456  0.5501  0.5503  0.5505  0.5506  0.5508  
R2 between groups 0.7631  0.7677  0.7680  0.7684  0.7686  0.7554  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 10.55, and 12 respectively. The 
amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 4872.39 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 5 - Regression results over matched scientists over the dCRC sample (the second stage of 2SLS) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0278 *** 0.0254 *** 0.0254 *** 0.0255 *** 0.0255 *** 0.0096 *** 
 (0.0074)  (0.0075)  (0.0075)  (0.0075)  (0.0075)  (0.0037)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0032  0.0035 * 0.0035 * -0.0001  0.0000  0.0030  
 (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0025)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0014  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016  
 (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0018)  
dFemalei -0.0906 * -0.0994 * -0.0480  -0.1001 ** -0.0584  -0.1266 * 
 (0.0514)  (0.0509)  (0.0759)  (0.0509)  (0.0761)  (0.0689)  
Ageit 0.0413 *** 0.0441 *** 0.0437 *** 0.0441 *** 0.0438 *** 0.0500 *** 
 (0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0096)  
Ageit2 -4.45E-04 *** -4.63E-04 *** -4.59E-04 *** -4.64E-04 *** -4.61E-04 *** -6.60E-04 *** 
 (1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (9.4E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.6047 *** 0.6048 *** 0.6047 *** 0.6044 *** 0.6043 *** 0.5991 *** 
 (0.0184)  (0.0183)  (0.0183)  (0.0183)  (0.0183)  (0.0163)  
dCRCit   0.1297 *** 0.1445 *** 0.0939 ** 0.1068 ** 0.0739 * 
   (0.0396)  (0.0427)  (0.0430)  (0.0464)  (0.0417)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     -0.0895    -0.0726  -0.0542  
     (0.0978)    (0.0982)  (0.0892)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      0.0084 ** 0.0082 ** 0.0074 ** 
       (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0036)  
Constant -1.2490 *** -1.3562 *** -1.3553 *** -1.3358 *** -1.3356 *** -0.7559 *** 
 (0.2877)  (0.2881)  (0.2881)  (0.2882  (0.2882  (0.2448)  
Number of observations 6393  6393  6393  6393  6393  6979  
Number of scientists 586  586  586  586  586  586  
χ2 3159.02 *** 3200.45 *** 3201.24 *** 3205.26 *** 3205.25 *** 3416.71 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2527  0.2533  0.2532  0.2536  0.2535  0.2521  
R2 overall 0.5332  0.5384  0.5387  0.5392  0.5394  0.5093  
R2 between groups 0.6986  0.7055  0.7060  0.7068  0.7071  0.6484  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 2, 10.9, and 12 respectively. The 
amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 323.5  and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 6 - Regression results over matched scientists over the dIndGCChair sample (the second stage of 2SLS) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0384 *** 0.0383 *** 0.0381 *** 0.0393 *** 0.0392 *** 0.0171 *** 
 (0.0093)  (0.0094)  (0.0094)  (0.0095)  (0.0095)  (0.0049)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0042  0.0043  0.0043  0.0097 ** 0.0098 ** 0.0103 *** 
 (0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.0043)  (0.0043)  (0.0040)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0018  0.0018  0.0018  0.0017  0.0017  0.0023  
 (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0025)  
dFemalei -0.1661 ** -0.1650 * -0.1462  -0.1623 * -0.1373  -0.2138 * 
 (0.0841)  (0.0843)  (0.1275)  (0.0845)  (0.1279)  (0.1136)  
Ageit -0.0045  -0.0044  -0.0041  -0.0039  -0.0036  0.0172  
 (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0144)  
Ageit2 -4.20E-05  -4.30E-05  -4.50E-05  -4.70E-05  -5.00E-05  -3.51E-04 *** 
 (1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.4E-04)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.5046 *** 0.5041 *** 0.5043 *** 0.5062 *** 0.5065 *** 0.5284 *** 
 (0.0261)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  (0.0228)  
dIndGCChairit   -0.0131  -0.0097  0.0496  0.0543  0.0470  
   (0.0587)  (0.0610)  (0.0691)  (0.0714)  (0.0630)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.0333    -0.0441  -0.0365  
     (0.1677)    (0.1681)  (0.1497)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      -0.0104 ** -0.0104 ** -0.0050  
       (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0053)  
Constant 0.0140  0.0134  0.0072  -0.0436  -0.0516  0.0580  
 (0.4565)  (0.4566)  (0.4578)  (0.4568)  (0.4580)  (0.3821)  
Number of observations 3234  3234  3234  3234  3234  3522  
Number of scientists 288  288  288  288  288  288  
χ2 1253.64 *** 1253.36 *** 1252.08 *** 1253.15 *** 1251.95 *** 1391.07 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2256  0.2256  0.2257  0.2261  0.2261  0.2401  
R2 overall 0.4303  0.4305  0.4306  0.4302  0.4303  0.4079  
R2 between groups 0.6001  0.6002  0.6001  0.5992  0.5992  0.5381  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 3, 11.22, and 12 respectively. The 
amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 135.45 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 7 - Regression results over matched scientists over the dChair sample (the second stage of 2SLS) 
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 2, 10.87, and 12 respectively. The 
amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 411.79 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
 
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is also done for each set of regressions separately. As 
explained before, the test first generates the residuals of “public funding” (as a function of all 
exogenous variables) and then put them in the original panel OLS model13. By showing that the 
coefficient of the residuals is significant, the test revealed the existence of endogeneity. The test is 
reported in the note of each table, indicating that coefficients of the residuals are significant. 
                                                 
13 For this test we use all variables that are available for regression, like variables in regression 5 of each table.  
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0388 *** 0.0367 *** 0.0368 *** 0.0366 *** 0.0367 *** 0.0119 *** 
 (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0028)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0068 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0126 *** 
 (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0022)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0016  0.0017  0.0017  0.0017  0.0017  0.0029  
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0015)  
dFemalei -0.1016 ** -0.1076 ** -0.0794  -0.1075 ** -0.0740  -0.1441 *** 
 (0.0422)  (0.0419)  (0.0615)  (0.0419)  (0.0616)  (0.0554)  
Ageit 0.0187 ** 0.0204 ** 0.0202 ** 0.0209 ** 0.0206 ** 0.0380 *** 
 (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0079)  
Ageit2 -2.24E-04 ** -2.40E-04 *** -2.38E-04 *** -2.43E-04 *** -2.41E-04 *** -5.24E-04 *** 
 (8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (7.6E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.5553 *** 0.5569 *** 0.5568 *** 0.5576 *** 0.5575 *** 0.5669 *** 
 (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0131)  
dChairit   0.1195 *** 0.1273 *** 0.1462 *** 0.1562 *** 0.1540 *** 
   (0.0321)  (0.0344)  (0.0353)  (0.0378)  (0.0342)  
dChairit*dFemalei     -0.0515    -0.0612  -0.0425  
     (0.0820)    (0.0823)  (0.0743)  
dChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      -0.0058 * -0.0059 * -0.0043  
       (0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.0030)  
Constant -0.7362 *** -0.7928 *** -0.7921 *** -0.8208 *** -0.8208 *** -0.5576 *** 
 (0.2365)  (0.2361)  (0.2361)  (0.2366)  (0.2366)  (0.2015)  
Number of observations 9092  9092  9092  9092  9092  9928  
Number of scientists 836  836  836  836  836  836  
χ2 4290.62 *** 4334.55 *** 4333.85 *** 4336.14 *** 4335.52 *** 4721.13 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2426  0.2437  0.2436  0.2441  0.2441  0.2516  
R2 overall 0.5054  0.5097  0.5098  0.5095  0.5097  0.4877  
R2 between groups 0.6817  0.6872  0.6874  0.6865  0.6867  0.6388  
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Our results clearly validate our first hypothesis but only partially validate our second hypothesis. One 
may question whether research chairs in general are an independent contributor to research 
productivity or whether they are simply a proxy for other known factors in literature. Considering the 
literature and mentioned mission or mandate of research chairs, it is possible to argue that holding a 
chair increases the amount of funding available to scientists. 
In our second hypothesis, we make a distinction between the effect of funding and holding a research 
chair. By matching pairs of chair holders and non-chair-holders who are similar to each other in terms 
of funding, gender, and research field, we can investigate other aspects of the impact of holding chair 
such as collaborating with brilliant talents. By estimating the regression model only on matched pairs 
of scientists, holding a chair cannot be a proxy for the matching criteria (funding, gender, and 
research field) anymore. Considering tables 5, 6, and 7, we can verify hypothesis 2 for industrial 
chairs and research chairs appointed by federal granting councils but this hypothesis cannot be 
validated for the ‘Canada research chairs’ because its effect is still positive and significant even after 
matching. In other words, same gender holders of Canada research chairs with equivalent funding and 
in the same research field as other scientists still generate a greater number of articles than these other 
scientists. 
We should be also very careful regarding measuring research productivity, which is done by counting 
the number of articles in this research. One may refer to the concept of co-authorship and argue that 
there be a considerable productivity difference between the person who is sole author and one who is 
author of paper with some co-authors. We have addressed this issue in our regressions by putting the 
number of co-authors in the right hand-side. The significant effect of this variable indicates that we 
have control the positive effect of number of coauthors on research productivity. Furthermore, we 
have shown the robustness of our analysis in this regard by providing appendices 9-14, in which the 
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dependent variable is fractional count of articles instead of total number of articles but the number of 
authors is not in right hand side anymore. This dependent variable only counts proportional 
contribution of each scientist. For instance, for an article with 4 authors each scientist adds 0.25 of an 
article in his/her index. We get the same results for this set of regressions, showing the robustness of 
our results. 
A number of factors can contribute to explaining this finding. The first is that the Canada research 
chair intends to be a prestigious research sign in Canada. Based on its mandate, the Canada research 
chair program aims to attract and retain some of most accomplished and promising minds in the 
world and it is awarded to scientists from all disciplines including engineering and the natural 
sciences, health sciences, humanities, and social sciences. It is more prestigious than any other 
research chairs, with the exception perhaps of the newly introduced Canada research excellence 
chairs, and the holders are expected to be more capable in expanding their collaborative research. 
Other scientists may also have more willingness to conduct collaborative research with the Canada 
research chair holders. In addition, the Canada research chair programme grants more visibility to the 
chair-holders and they can recruit more talented students and researchers. 
The second explanation is that industrial chairs are appointed by firms to promote research and its 
application, probably with major benefits to the firms themselves and as such, serve an entirely 
different purpose. In other words, this type of chair is not necessarily and originally designed for the 
sake of scientific publication. The chairs appointed by research councils may have quite similar 
characteristics. Looking at these chairs’ description, most of chair holders are appointed as industrial 
chair, partly funded by industry and by the relevant granting council. There is some evidence in the 
literature indicating that industrial funding forces researchers to shift to more applied research, 
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neglecting their normative responsibilities for knowledge development (Geuna and Nesta, 2003; 
Partha and David, 1994). 
In addition to the effect of holding a chair on scientific productivity, there are also some interesting 
results regarding the control variables in econometric model. Funding from different sources is 
always a positive and significant determinant of scientific productivity before matching14. After 
matching, however, the positive effect of funding is only significant for public funding and private 
funding. We also consider the effect of interaction between “holding a chair” and the amount of 
funding. From a technical point of view, it is not possible to estimate the interactive effect with an 
endogenous variable in 2SLS models because its amount is estimated in the first stage and we are not 
using the raw value reported in dataset. However, we can estimate the effect of the interaction of 
holding a chair with private funding15. 
The effect of this interactive variable is positive and significant for dCRC before and after matching. 
This suggests that private funding contributes to helping Canada research chair-holder increase their 
scientific productivity. In contrast, the funding and chair interaction is not significant for 
dIndGCChair before matching but negative and significant after matching, hence implying that both 
chair-holders and non-chair-holders positively benefit from private funding before matching but after 
matching this effect disappears. The same story is valid for dChair. The interactive effect of dChair 
and private funding is positive before matching but negative after matching. Looking precisely at the 
numbers, the results reveal that private funding has a positive effect before matching but its positive 
                                                 
14 Funding from the private sector and funding from the not-for-profit sector are directly put in the regression equation 
while funding from the public sector is first estimated by the instrumental variables and then inserted into the regression 
model. The first stage model regressions, reported in appendices 4 to 9, show the significant role of instrumental 
variables. 
15 The interaction with between the chair dummy variables and not-for-profit funding was tested and was never significant.  
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effect is be weakened or even disappears after matching (the combined effect of private funding with 
its interactive effect is shown in figure 4 for dIndGCChair and dChair after matching). 
 
Figure 4 – Comparison of private funding effect on scientific productivity for different values of dIndGCChair and dChair 
 
Considering the fact that industrial chairs are partially funded by the private sector, we suspect that 
more private funding for industrial chair-holders may detract the chair holder from scientific 
traditional outputs and towards non-scientific and/or more technological and applied outputs such as 
patents. The negative effect of private funding on scientific productivity finds some echo in the 
literature (Goldfarb, 2008; Kleinman and Vallas, 2001). 
The gender of a scientist has a negative and significant impact, implying that women are less likely to 
publish than men, another result vastly supported in the literature (Kyvik and Teigen, 1996; Leahey, 
2006; Long, 1990). In terms of interaction between chair and gender, we would argue that before 
matching, this interactive effect is negative and significant for dCRC and dChair but is non-
significant after matching. This would tend to suggest that in general a female scientist may benefit 
The effect of private funding
for non-IndGCChair after
matching (slope=0.0097)
The effect of private funding
for IndGCChair after matching
(slope= -0.0007)
The effect of private funding
for non-dChair after matching
(slope=0.0097)
The effect of private funding
for non-dChair after matching
(slope=0.0039)
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less from holding a chair than her male colleagues. But when only matched pairs are kept in the 
dataset, the higher scientific productivity of male chair-holder compared to male non-chair-holder is 
not different from that of their female colleagues. 
The age of the scientists seems to affect scientific productivity negatively before matching and with 
an inverted-U shape pattern (with a peak around 48 years old) after matching. Such life-cycle and 
investment motivated behaviour is acknowledged in the literature (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003; 
Diamond, 1986; Levin and Stephan, 1991). Age loses its significance when scientist pairs are 
matched based on dIndGCChair, possibly because of smaller size of data for this chair. The results 
for panel OLS regression are also provided to show that the results of our paper are robust enough 
(the sixth row of each table). 
Conclusion 
In this article we show that holding a research chair is a significant determinant of scientific 
publication when the regression is run over the entire data set of Quebec scientists. As previously 
explained, a distinction should be made to clarify different attributes of research chairs and their 
effect on scientific productivity. For instance, the research chair comes with its own funds so the 
question of interest is whether we can find a positive effect of research chairs on scientific 
productivity after controlling for the funding obtained by the chair holder. To investigate this 
relationship, we applied a matching technique to control for gender, funding and research field of 
chair and non-chair holders. This may indicate whether the effect of holding a research chair on 
scientific productivity is still significant after controlling for the mentioned attributes.  
After such matching, the results show that the effect of the Canada research chair program on 
scientific productivity remains significant and positive while the effect of industrial chairs and the 
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chairs appointed by Canada federal granting council (NSERC, and CIHR) become non-significant. 
This finding highlights the special attributes of the Canada research chair program, which are not 
replicated in other chairs. Those specific attributes may significantly push scientific productivity. 
Among others, Canada research chairs are generally associated with some degree of prestige or 
higher visibility to recruit talented students or to have research collaboration with top scientists in the 
field. The fact that other types of research chairs, once matched with equivalent scientists, do not 
have an impact on scientific output in terms of quantity, implies not that these chair holders are lesser 
scientists, but that they are devoting part of their time to other endeavours of a more practical nature. 
Hence universities are maintaining a balance between the pursuit of pure scientific knowledge and its 
application to socio-economic benefits. We are not going to shock anyone by stating that by solely 
studying scientific articles, we are missing a great deal of the role of university professors. Although 
not trivial, future research should aim to cast a wider net on outputs, outcomes and impacts of 
university research. 
Based on the discussion in Mirnezami and Beaudry (2015), our research has a number of limitations. 
First, the data has a number of missing entries, particularly regarding gender and age, there may be 
some selection bias introduced by this missing information. Second, our study only covers the 
province of Quebec and may not be generalised to other parts of the world. Third, in the 2SLS model, 
we used instruments for public funding, which were the best possible and accessible variables at the 
time of the study but there may be better instruments such as the size of the department or of the 
research group. Fourth, we used the number of articles as a measure of scientific productivity, which 
is appropriate but it cannot completely reflect the productivity of scientists. In addition, the Web of 
Science does not cover adequately the social sciences and humanities fields.  
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Let us now make a few suggestions for further studies. The first suggestion is to make a qualitative 
analysis on the attributes of the research chairs. Gathering data from interviews with chair-holders or 
surveys filled up by experts would shed some light on how holding a research chair contributes to 
scientific productivity. Such qualitative work could help investigate the effect of research chair from 
a social or psychological point of view. Moreover, it would also be possible to find the institutional 
effect of the research chairs or the impact of peripheral institutional settings on the performance of 
research chairs. 
The second suggestion is to make a comparison between the short-term and long-term effect of 
research chairs on scientific productivity. Although we understand that some types of research chairs 
may not have a significant effect on scientific publication (a short-term effect), our research did not 
make any investigation on how they form networks and accumulate research skills for future studies 
or how the chairs train the next generation of scientists. 
Finally, a third suggestion would be to investigate other types of outputs for research chairs which are 
not devoted to purely academic endeavours but aimed at a more applied impact. The results for the 
impact of these types of chairs may be completely different. Our research is therefore limited by the 
variables used to measure output (of a purely scientific nature).  
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Appendix 1 – Variable description 
Variable name Variable description 
dIndChair 
Dummy variables taking the value 1 if a scientist has a research chair awarded 
by industry (industrial chair) 
dGCChair 
Dummy variables taking the value 1 if a scientist has a research chair awarded 
by Canadian funding agencies (NSERC, SSHRC, and CIHR) 
dCRC Dummy variables taking the value 1 if a scientist has a Canada research chair 
dIndGCChair Dummy variables taking the value 1 if dIndChair or dGCChair are equal to 1 
dChair 
Dummy variables taking the value 1 if any of dIndChair, dGCChair, or dCRC 
is equal to 1 
ln(PublicfundingO) 
Natural logarithm of the three-year average of public sector funding for the 
purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure of research 
ln(PrivatefundingO) 
Natural logarithm of the three-year average of private sector funding for the 
purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure of research 
ln(NFPfundingO) 
Natural logarithm of three-year average of funding from not-for-profit 
institutions (NFP) for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure 
of research 
ln(nbArticle) Natural logarithm of the yearly number of articles 
PubORank 
Normalized rank of researcher in the research division in terms of three-year 
average of funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure 
of research 
PublRank 
Normalized rank of researcher in the research division in terms of three-year 
average of number of articles 
nbScientistUni Number of scientists in the university and division16 of researcher 
Age Age of a scientist  
dFemale 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the scientist is a woman and 0 
otherwise 
ULaval, dUdeM, dUQ_UBishop, 
dUConcordia, dUMcGill 
dUSherbrooke, 
dUQAM_ETS_INRS 
Dummy variables indicating the university affiliation of researcher 
dMedical, dScience, 
dBusinessManagement, 
dEducation, dEngineering, 
dHealthScience, dHumanities, 
dNonhealth, and dSocialScience 
Dummy variables indicating the research division of researcher 
d2000, d2001, …., d2012 Dummy variables indicating the year 
  
                                                 
16 There are 9 divisions of  Basic Medical Sciences, Business & Management, Education, Engineering, Health Sciences, Humanities, 
Non-Health Professional, Sciences, and Social Sciences 
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Appendix 2 – Summary statistics 
 Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
nbArticles 1.3881 2.8361 0 85 
PublicfundingO 64,890.39 151,411.80 0 10,100,000 
PrivatefundingO 10,885.52 68,773.97 0 6,257,323 
NFPfundingO 11,070.96 84,990.96 0 8,404,625 
Age 52.6287 9.9491 1 94 
dFemale 0.2829 0.4504 0 1 
nbAuthor 0.8476 0.8295 0 7.6327 
PubORank 0.5663 0.2576 0.0005 1 
PublRank 0.7442 0.1833 0.3206 1 
nbScientistUni 5.5921 0.8049 0.6931 7.3803 
dCRC 0.0391 0.1938 0 1 
dIndGCChair 0.0206 0.1421 0 1 
dChair 0.0569 0.2317 0 1 
Note: The variables are not in logarithmic scale and they are raw numbers (Number of Observations: 80775) 
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ln(nbArticles) 1             
ln(PublicfundingO) 0.3543 1            
ln(PrivatefundingO) 0.3207 0.2120 1           
ln(NFPfundingO) 0.3093 0.2605 0.2843 1          
Age -0.1415 -0.2794 -0.0742 -0.1140 1         
dFemale -0.1100 -0.0014 -0.1311 -0.0329 -0.1298 1        
ln(nbAuthor) 0.7127 0.3502 0.3285 0.3262 -0.1263 -0.1013 1       
PubORank 0.3502 0.7036 0.2099 0.2633 -0.1371 -0.0052 0.3375 1      
PublRank 0.3382 0.2770 0.0919 0.1300 -0.1196 0.0508 0.3204 0.4026 1     
ln(nbScientistUni) 0.1545 -0.0152 0.1216 0.1157 0.0617 -0.0767 0.2442 0.0454 -0.0902 1    
dCRC 0.1554 0.1590 0.1032 0.1112 -0.0743 -0.0385 0.1090 0.2258 0.1052 -0.0223 1   
dIndGCChair 0.0800 0.0872 0.2112 0.1017 0.0095 -0.0486 0.0529 0.1082 0.0044 -0.0055 0.0724 1  
dChair 0.1700 0.1780 0.1959 0.1432 -0.0543 -0.0572 0.1171 0.2426 0.0866 -0.0243 0.8211 0.5906 1 
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at 1% level (Number of observations: 80775) 
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Appendix 3 -First stage of the regressions reported in table 2 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) -0.0048  -0.0049 * -0.0049 * -0.0034  -0.0034  
 (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0211 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0214 *** 
 (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
dFemalei 0.2437 *** 0.2396 *** 0.2374 *** 0.2401 *** 0.2391 *** 
 (0.0384)  (0.0380)  (0.0385)  (0.0379)  (0.0384)  
Ageit 0.1395 *** 0.1364 *** 0.1364 *** 0.1361 *** 0.1361 *** 
 (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0104)  (0.0104)  
Ageit2 -0.0019 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1965 *** 0.1956 *** 0.1956 *** 0.1949 *** 0.1949 *** 
 (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  
dCRCit   -0.2791 *** -0.2945 *** -0.1849 * -0.1926 * 
   (0.0873)  (0.0974)  (0.0970)  (0.1078)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     0.0744    0.0343  
     (0.2116)    (0.2118)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      -0.0255 ** -0.0253 ** 
       (0.0115)  (0.0115)  
PubORankit-1 10.0707 *** 10.1046 *** 10.1057 *** 10.1080 *** 10.1084 *** 
 (0.0485)  (0.0488)  (0.0488)  (0.0488)  (0.0488)  
PublRankit-1 1.5967 *** 1.6057 *** 1.6057 *** 1.6046 *** 1.6047 *** 
 (0.0957)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4284 *** -0.4339 *** -0.4340 *** -0.4349 *** -0.4350 *** 
 (0.0259)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  (0.0256)  (0.0256)  
Constant 0.7895 ** 0.8879 *** 0.8894 *** 0.8982 *** 0.8988 *** 
 (0.3235)  (0.3225)  (0.3223)  (0.3219)  (0.3219)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  
χ2 75797 *** 76288 *** 76318 *** 76438 *** 76450 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2082  0.2080  0.2080  0.2079  0.2079  
R2 overall 0.5459  0.5504  0.5506  0.5511  0.5512  
R2 between groups 0.7486  0.7548  0.7551  0.756  0.7562  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the 
first stage but we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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Appendix 4 -First stage of the regressions reported in table 3 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) -0.0048  -0.0037  -0.0037  -0.0039  -0.0038  
 (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0211 *** 0.0215 *** 0.0215 *** 0.0215 *** 0.0215 *** 
 (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
dFemalei 0.2437 *** 0.2440 *** 0.2459 *** 0.2439 *** 0.2458 *** 
 (0.0384)  (0.0384)  (0.0386)  (0.0383)  (0.0386)  
Ageit 0.1395 *** 0.1395 *** 0.1396 *** 0.1394 *** 0.1395 *** 
 (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  
Ageit2 -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1965 *** 0.1952 *** 0.1952 *** 0.1952 *** 0.1952 *** 
 (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  
dIndGCChairit   -0.4995 *** -0.4778 *** -0.5273 *** -0.5052 *** 
   (0.1244)  (0.1328)  (0.1660)  (0.1727)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.1650    -0.1641  
     (0.3539)    (0.3537)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      0.0037  0.0036  
       (0.0147)  (0.0147)  
PubORankit-1 10.0707 *** 10.0824 *** 10.0823 *** 10.0829 *** 10.0828 *** 
 (0.0485)  (0.0486)  (0.0486)  (0.0486)  (0.0486)  
PublRankit-1 1.5967 *** 1.6056 *** 1.6051 *** 1.6051 *** 1.6046 *** 
 (0.0957)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4284 *** -0.4275 *** -0.4275 *** -0.4275 *** -0.4275 *** 
 (0.0259)  (0.0259)  (0.0259)  (0.0259)  (0.0259)  
Constant 0.7895 ** 0.7590 ** 0.7584 ** 0.7618 ** 0.7612 ** 
 (0.3235)  (0.3235)  (0.3235)  (0.3235)  (0.3235)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  
χ2 75797 *** 75835 *** 75838 *** 75859 *** 75862 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2082  0.2083  0.2083  0.2083  0.2083  
R2 overall 0.5459  0.5462  0.5463  0.5463  0.5464  
R2 between groups 0.7486  0.7489  0.749  0.7491  0.7491  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the 
first stage but we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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Appendix 5 -First stage of the regressions reported in table 4 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) -0.0048  -0.0042  -0.0042  -0.0024  -0.0024  
 (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0031)  (0.0031)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0211 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0217 *** 
 (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
dFemalei 0.2437 *** 0.2391 *** 0.2369 *** 0.2400 *** 0.2390 *** 
 (0.0384)  (0.0380)  (0.0388)  (0.0380)  (0.0387)  
Ageit 0.1395 *** 0.1363 *** 0.1363 *** 0.1364 *** 0.1363 *** 
 (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0104)  (0.0104)  
Ageit2 -0.0019 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1965 *** 0.1950 *** 0.1949 *** 0.1942 *** 0.1942 *** 
 (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  
dChairit   -0.3415 *** -0.3518 *** -0.2579 *** -0.2632 *** 
   (0.0745)  (0.0820)  (0.0857)  (0.0937)  
dChair5it*dFemalei     0.0547    0.0255  
     (0.1850)    (0.1853)  
dChair5it*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      -0.0181 ** -0.0180 ** 
       (0.0092)  (0.0093)  
PubORankit-1 10.0707 *** 10.1136 *** 10.1144 *** 10.1165 *** 10.1169 *** 
 (0.0485)  (0.0489)  (0.0489)  (0.0489)  (0.0489)  
PublRankit-1 1.5967 *** 1.6149 *** 1.6150 *** 1.6150 *** 1.6150 *** 
 (0.0957)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4284 *** -0.4346 *** -0.4346 *** -0.4350 *** -0.4351 *** 
 (0.0259)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  
Constant 0.7895 *** 0.8798 *** 0.8810 *** 0.8733 *** 0.8740 *** 
 (0.3235)  (0.3223)  (0.3222)  (0.3220)  (0.3220)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  
χ2 75797 *** 76248 *** 76270 *** 76338 *** 76349 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2082  0.2082  0.2083  0.2082  0.2082  
R2 overall 0.5459  0.5502  0.5504  0.5506  0.5508  
R2 between groups 0.7486  0.7545  0.7548  0.7552  0.7554  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the 
first stage but we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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Appendix 6 -First stage of the regressions reported in table 5 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0384 *** 0.0387 *** 0.0386 *** 0.0551 *** 0.0546 *** 
 (0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.0065)  (0.0065)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0306 *** 0.0306 *** 0.0306 *** 0.0307 *** 0.0307 *** 
 (0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0048)  
dFemalei -0.1671  -0.1820  -0.4000 ** -0.1792  -0.3540 * 
 (0.1283)  (0.1270)  (0.1896)  (0.1269)  (0.1898)  
Ageit 0.0905 *** 0.0951 *** 0.0966 *** 0.0951 *** 0.0964 *** 
 (0.0278)  (0.0279)  (0.0279)  (0.0278)  (0.0279)  
Ageit2 -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1554 *** 0.1569 *** 0.1568 *** 0.1588 *** 0.1586 *** 
 (0.0513)  (0.0513)  (0.0513)  (0.0512)  (0.0512)  
dCRCit   0.2235 ** 0.1596  0.3833 *** 0.3280 *** 
   (0.0991)  (0.1073)  (0.1070)  (0.1159)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     0.3792    0.3040  
     (0.2447)    (0.2454)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      -0.0378 *** -0.0368 *** 
       (0.0096)  (0.0096)  
PubORankit-1 6.4595 *** 6.4423 *** 6.4395 *** 6.4371 *** 6.4348 *** 
 (0.1224)  (0.1229)  (0.1229)  (0.1227)  (0.1227)  
PublRankit-1 0.8820 *** 0.8443 *** 0.8515 *** 0.8452 *** 0.8511 *** 
 (0.2087)  (0.2089)  (0.2089)  (0.2086)  (0.2087)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.2852 *** -0.2669 *** -0.2730 *** -0.2722 *** -0.2769 *** 
 (0.0700)  (0.0697)  (0.0698)  (0.0697)  (0.0698)  
Constant 4.5170 *** 4.2376 *** 4.2679 *** 4.1752 *** 4.2009 *** 
 (0.8221)  (0.8278)  (0.8279)  (0.8272)  (0.8274)  
Number of observations 6393  6393  6393  6393  6393  
Number of scientists 586  586  586  586  586  
χ2 4260 *** 4288 *** 4292 *** 4313 *** 4315 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2527  0.2519  0.2518  0.2521  0.2521  
R2 overall 0.5038  0.5084  0.5087  0.5092  0.5093  
R2 between groups 0.6404  0.6471  0.6475  0.6483  0.6484  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the 
first stage but we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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Appendix 7 -First stage of the regressions reported in table 6 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0457 *** 0.0481 *** 0.0481 *** -0.0108  -0.0106  
 (0.0085)  (0.0086)  (0.0086)  (0.0120)  (0.0120)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0304 *** 0.0311 *** 0.0313 *** 0.0323 *** 0.0324 *** 
 (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  
dFemalei 0.0215  0.0476  0.3081  0.0150  0.2072  
 (0.2363)  (0.2366)  (0.3577)  (0.2355)  (0.3562)  
Ageit 0.3513 *** 0.3537 *** 0.3552 *** 0.3461 *** 0.3473 *** 
 (0.0463)  (0.0463)  (0.0464)  (0.0460)  (0.0461)  
Ageit2 -0.0037 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0036 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1862 ** 0.1735 ** 0.1768 ** 0.1511 * 0.1536 * 
 (0.0803)  (0.0805)  (0.0806)  (0.0800)  (0.0801)  
dIndGCChairit   -0.3138 ** -0.2690  -0.9872 *** -0.9519 *** 
   (0.1646)  (0.1712)  (0.1894)  (0.1961)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.4566    -0.3369  
     (0.4696)    (0.4675)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      0.1119 *** 0.1115 *** 
       (0.0158)  (0.0158)  
PubORankit-1 6.8202 *** 6.8098 *** 6.8054 *** 6.7298 *** 6.7268 *** 
 (0.1870)  (0.1870)  (0.1870)  (0.1859)  (0.1860)  
PublRankit-1 1.3377 *** 1.3282 *** 1.3256 *** 1.2888 *** 1.2871 *** 
 (0.3000)  (0.3000)  (0.3001)  (0.2979)  (0.2980)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4670 *** -0.4341 ** -0.4282 ** -0.4165 ** -0.4122 ** 
 (0.1786)  (0.1794)  (0.1798)  (0.1785)  (0.1789)  
Constant -1.6525  -1.8467  -1.9517  -1.3026  -1.3824  
 (1.6226)  (1.6254)  (1.6305)  (1.6175)  (1.6228)  
Number of observations 3234  3234  3234  3234  3234  
Number of scientists 288  288  288  288  288  
χ2 2879 *** 2885 *** 2884 *** 2977 *** 2976 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2396  0.2396  0.2397  0.24  0.2401  
R2 overall 0.4085  0.4083  0.4083  0.408  0.4079  
R2 between groups 0.5395  0.5392  0.539  0.5383  0.5381  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the 
first stage but we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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Appendix 8 -First stage of the regressions reported in table 7 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0281 *** 0.0281 *** 0.0281 *** 0.0135 ** 0.0133 ** 
 (0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0064)  (0.0064)  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0266 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0265 *** 0.0266 *** 
 (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  
dFemalei -0.0492  -0.0464  -0.1461  -0.0473  -0.1738  
 (0.1141)  (0.1134)  (0.1664)  (0.1134)  (0.1667)  
Ageit 0.1203 *** 0.1194 *** 0.1202 *** 0.1172 *** 0.1181 *** 
 (0.0247)  (0.0246)  (0.0247)  (0.0246)  (0.0247)  
Ageit2 -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1686 *** 0.1673 *** 0.1675 *** 0.1640 *** 0.1642 *** 
 (0.0453)  (0.0453)  (0.0453)  (0.0453)  (0.0453)  
dChairit   -0.0492  -0.0771  -0.1837 * -0.2219 ** 
   (0.0875)  (0.0939)  (0.0963)  (0.1031)  
dChair5it*dFemalei     0.1819    0.2309  
     (0.2223)    (0.2228)  
dChair5it*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)      0.0292 *** 0.0298 *** 
       (0.0087)  (0.0088)  
PubORankit-1 7.0954 *** 7.1057 *** 7.1028 *** 7.1086 *** 7.1050 *** 
 (0.1067)  (0.1071)  (0.1072)  (0.1071)  (0.1072)  
PublRankit-1 1.1549 *** 1.1578 *** 1.1579 *** 1.1592 *** 1.1593 *** 
 (0.1783)  (0.1784)  (0.1784)  (0.1783)  (0.1783)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.1736 *** -0.1772 *** -0.1794 *** -0.1777 *** -0.1806 *** 
 (0.0653)  (0.0652)  (0.0653)  (0.0652)  (0.0653)  
Constant 2.5660 *** 2.6143 *** 2.6237 *** 2.7596 *** 2.7745 *** 
 (0.7358)  (0.7375)  (0.7377)  (0.7387)  (0.7389)  
Number of observations 9092  9092  9092  9092  9092  
Number of scientists 836  836  836  836  836  
χ2 7043 *** 7064 *** 7063 *** 7080 *** 7081 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2514  0.2513  0.2513  0.2516  0.2516  
R2 overall 0.4828  0.4878  0.4878  0.4876  0.4877  
R2 between groups 0.6317  0.6393  0.6394  0.6388  0.6388  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the 
first stage but we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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Appendix 9 -Regression results over the entire sample and using dChair (the second stage of 2SLS) - The left hand-side variable 
is fractional count of articles 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0534 *** 0.0491 *** 0.0491 *** 0.0493 *** 0.0492 *** 0.0239 *** 
 0.0027  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0014  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0079 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0093 *** 
 0.0011  0.0011  0.0011  0.0012  0.0012  0.0011  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0058 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0085 *** 
 0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  
dFemalei -0.1342 *** -0.1247 *** -0.1163 *** -0.1251 *** -0.1175 *** -0.1274 *** 
 0.0196  0.0193  0.0196  0.0192  0.0196  0.0155  
Ageit 0.0437 *** 0.0459 *** 0.0458 *** 0.0457 *** 0.0456 *** 0.0453 *** 
 0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0045  
Ageit2 -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0005 *** 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  
dCRCit   0.4226 *** 0.4613 *** 0.3625 *** 0.4002 *** 0.4276 *** 
   0.0382  0.0420  0.0423  0.0462  0.0368  
dCRCit*dFemalei     -0.2134 **   -0.1951 ** -0.1960 *** 
     0.0967    0.0967  0.0760  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)       0.0137 *** 0.0132 *** 0.0160 *** 
       0.0042  0.0042  0.0038  
Constant -0.8234 *** -0.8669 *** -0.8659 *** -0.8599 *** -0.8594 *** -0.5040 *** 
 0.1418  0.1408  0.1407  0.1407  0.1406  0.1155  
Number of observations 33839  33839  33839  33839  33839  37221  
Number of scientists 5811  5811  5811  5811  5811  5930  
χ2 1262.17  1413.64  1420.04  1427.01  1432.18  1827.72  
R2 within groups 0.0101  0.0107  0.0107  0.0107  0.0107  0.0148  
R2 overall 0.0793  0.0988  0.0994  0.1001  0.1005  0.0995  
R2 between groups 0.1381  0.1606  0.1616  0.1625  0.1633  0.1631  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 
5.82, and 12 respectively. The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 10024.33 and significant at level of 0.01, implying 
that endogeneity exists. 
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Appendix 10 -Regression results over the entire sample and using dIndGCChair (the second stage of 2SLS) - The left hand-side 
variable is fractional count of articles 
 xtivreg7  xtivreg8  xtivreg9  xtivreg10  xtivreg11  xtreg12  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0534 *** 0.0528 *** 0.0528 *** 0.0528 *** 0.0527 *** 0.0255 *** 
 0.0027  0.0027  0.0027  0.0027  0.0027  0.0014  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) -0.1342 *** -0.1342 *** -0.1310 *** -0.1343 *** -0.1311 *** -0.1412 *** 
 0.0196  0.0195  0.0197  0.0195  0.0197  0.0155  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0437 *** 0.0436 *** 0.0436 *** 0.0435 *** 0.0435 *** 0.0435 *** 
 0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0046  
dFemalei -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0005 *** 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  
Ageit 0.0079 *** 0.0076 *** 0.0076 *** 0.0074 *** 0.0074 *** 0.0101 *** 
 0.0011  0.0011  0.0011  0.0011  0.0011  0.0011  
Ageit2 0.0058 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0087 *** 
 0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  
dIndGCChairit   0.1673 *** 0.1935 *** 0.1237 ** 0.1505 ** 0.1526 ** 
   0.0541  0.0575  0.0739  0.0766  0.0640  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.2116    -0.2097  -0.2574 ** 
     0.1585    0.1584  0.1221  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)       0.0053  0.0052  0.0091  
       0.0061  0.0061  0.0056  
Constant -0.8234 *** -0.8104 *** -0.8112 *** -0.8076 *** -0.8085 *** -0.4452 *** 
 0.1418  0.1418  0.1418  0.1419  0.1418  0.1164  
Number of observations 33839  33839  33839  33839  33839  37221  
Number of scientists 5811  5811  5811  5811  5811  5930  
χ2 1262.17  1271.42  1273.72  1272.58  1274.83  1548.49  
R2 within groups 0.0101  0.0102  0.0102  0.0102  0.0102  0.0147  
R2 overall 0.0793  0.0807  0.0810  0.0809  0.0812  0.0801  
R2 between groups 0.1381  0.1399  0.1403  0.1401  0.1405  0.1396  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 
5.82, and 12 respectively. The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 10392.54 and significant at level of 0.01, implying 
that endogeneity exists. 
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Appendix 11 -Regression results over the entire sample and using dChair (the second stage of 2SLS) - The left hand-side 
variable is fractional count of articles 
 xtivreg13  xtivreg14  xtivreg15  xtivreg16  xtivreg17  xtreg18  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.0534 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0489 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0238 *** 
 0.0027  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0014  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) -0.1342 *** -0.1266 *** -0.1171 *** -0.1272 *** -0.1183 *** -0.1277 *** 
 0.0196  0.0193  0.0198  0.0193  0.0198  0.0156  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0437 *** 0.0454 *** 0.0453 *** 0.0451 *** 0.0450 *** 0.0446 *** 
 0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0054  0.0045  
dFemalei -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0005 *** 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  
Ageit 0.0079 *** 0.0072 *** 0.0072 *** 0.0063 *** 0.0064 *** 0.0086 *** 
 0.0011  0.0011  0.0011  0.0012  0.0012  0.0011  
Ageit2 0.0058 *** 0.0055 *** 0.0055 *** 0.0055 *** 0.0056 *** 0.0082 *** 
 0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  0.0010  
dChairit   0.3521 *** 0.3828 *** 0.3057 *** 0.3368 *** 0.3662 *** 
   0.0326  0.0355  0.0376  0.0406  0.0326  
dChairit*dFemalei     -0.1848 **   -0.1724 ** -0.1862 *** 
     0.0845    0.0846  0.0662  
dChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)       0.0087 ** 0.0082 ** 0.0101 *** 
       0.0035  0.0035  0.0032  
Constant -0.8234 *** -0.8351 *** -0.8343 *** -0.8244 *** -0.8242 *** -0.4703 *** 
 0.1418  0.1408  0.1407  0.1408  0.1408  0.1156  
Number of observations 33839  33839  33839  33839  33839  37221  
Number of scientists 5811  5811  5811  5811  5811  5930  
χ2 1262.17  1401.97  1408.2  1408.5  1413.85  1807.01  
R2 within groups 0.0101  0.0107  0.0107  0.0107  0.0107  0.0151  
R2 overall 0.0793  0.0976  0.0982  0.0982  0.0987  0.0974  
R2 between groups 0.1381  0.1596  0.1606  0.1605  0.1614  0.1603  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 
5.82, and 12 respectively. The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 10016.70 and significant at level of 0.01, implying 
that endogeneity exists. 
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Appendix 12 - Regression results over matched scientists over the dCRC sample (the second stage of 2SLS) - The left hand-side 
variable is fractional count of articles 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.1013 *** 0.0951 *** 0.0949 *** 0.0943 *** 0.0941 *** 0.0364 *** 
 0.0212  0.0214  0.0214  0.0213  0.0214  0.0095  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0059  0.0064 * 0.0064 * 0.0013  0.0014  0.0040  
 0.0037  0.0037  0.0037  0.0048  0.0048  0.0045  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0013  0.0016  0.0016  0.0015  0.0015  0.0030  
 0.0036  0.0036  0.0036  0.0036  0.0036  0.0034  
dFemalei -0.1739  -0.1926 * -0.1489  -0.1929 * -0.1602  -0.2241  
 0.1175  0.1167  0.1745  0.1168  0.1748  0.1522  
Ageit 0.1183 *** 0.1237 *** 0.1236 *** 0.1232 *** 0.1232 *** 0.1366 *** 
 0.0236  0.0236  0.0236  0.0236  0.0236  0.0202  
Ageit2 -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0014 *** 
 0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  
dCRCit   0.2615 *** 0.2727 *** 0.2037 ** 0.2125 ** 0.2110 *** 
   0.0891  0.0952  0.0957  0.1021  0.0880  
dCRCit*dFemalei     -0.0763    -0.0570  -0.0416  
     0.2266    0.2271  0.1980  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)       0.0120 * 0.0119 * 0.0128 * 
       0.0071  0.0071  0.0066  
Constant -3.0716 *** -3.2415 *** -3.2443 *** -3.1902 *** -3.1927 *** -2.5701 *** 
 0.6126  0.6127  0.6129  0.6135  0.6137  0.5079  
Number of observations 4140  4140  4140  4140  4140  4529  
Number of scientists 535  535  535  535  535  540  
χ2 196.383  207.762  207.857  210.223  210.236  235.122  
R2 within groups 0.0324  0.0332  0.0332  0.0337  0.0337  0.0397  
R2 overall 0.0769  0.0894  0.0894  0.0905  0.0905  0.0794  
R2 between groups 0.1097  0.1268  0.1270  0.1294  0.1295  0.1138  
 Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 
7.73, and 12 respectively. The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 489.01 and significant at level of 0.01, implying 
that endogeneity exists. 
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Appendix 13 - Regression results over matched scientists over the dIndGCChair sample (the second stage of 2SLS) - The left 
hand-side variable is fractional count of articles 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.1273 *** 0.1269 *** 0.1263 *** 0.1268 *** 0.1263 *** 0.0621 *** 
 0.0259  0.0259  0.0259  0.0261  0.0261  0.0124  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) 0.0057  0.0058  0.0058  0.0078  0.0078  0.0117 * 
 0.0058  0.0058  0.0058  0.0075  0.0075  0.0069  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0006  0.0017  
 0.0048  0.0048  0.0048  0.0048  0.0049  0.0045  
dFemalei -0.2583  -0.2572  -0.1684  -0.2575  -0.1669  -0.1851  
 0.1672  0.1678  0.2548  0.1681  0.2554  0.2283  
Ageit 0.0270  0.0274  0.0282  0.0279  0.0287  0.0590 ** 
 0.0339  0.0340  0.0340  0.0340  0.0340  0.0279  
Ageit2 -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0006 ** 
 0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  
dIndGCChairit   -0.0150  -0.0013  0.0139  0.0285  0.0099  
   0.1095  0.1137  0.1321  0.1358  0.1208  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.1552    -0.1582  -0.2215  
     0.3344    0.3352  0.2979  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)       -0.0043  -0.0044  -0.0009  
       0.0109  0.0109  0.0099  
Constant -1.0514  -1.0560  -1.0738  -1.0782  -1.0966  -1.1293  
 0.8704  0.8711  0.8724  0.8727  0.8740  0.7316  
Number of observations 2194  2194  2194  2194  2194  2395  
Number of scientists 271  271  271  271  271  273  
χ2 93.4697  93.3524  93.5299  93.0448  93.2272  107.734  
R2 within groups 0.0210  0.0211  0.0212  0.0212  0.0212  0.0333  
R2 overall 0.0853  0.0851  0.0860  0.0847  0.0857  0.0700  
R2 between groups 0.1729  0.1730  0.1728  0.1720  0.1719  0.1245  
 Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 
8.09, and 12 respectively. The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 213.04 and significant at level of 0.01, implying 
that endogeneity exists. 
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Appendix 14 - Regression results over matched scientists over the dChair sample (the second stage of 2SLS) - The left hand-side 
variable is fractional count of articles 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit+1) 0.1158 *** 0.1108 *** 0.1108 *** 0.1107 *** 0.1108 *** 0.0394 *** 
 0.0148  0.0149  0.0149  0.0149  0.0149  0.0069  
ln(PrivatefundingOit+1) -0.1634 ** -0.1777 ** -0.1433  -0.1776 ** -0.1439  -0.2146 ** 
 0.0923  0.0919  0.1354  0.0919  0.1356  0.1173  
ln(NFPfundingOit+1) 0.0799 *** 0.0825 *** 0.0824 *** 0.0825 *** 0.0824 *** 0.1056 *** 
 0.0191  0.0191  0.0191  0.0191  0.0191  0.0163  
dFemalei -0.0008 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0011 *** 
 0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  
Ageit 0.0086 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0125 *** 
 0.0032  0.0032  0.0032  0.0042  0.0042  0.0039  
Ageit2 0.0022  0.0022  0.0022  0.0022  0.0022  0.0055  
 0.0031  0.0031  0.0031  0.0031  0.0031  0.0028  
dChairit   0.2069 *** 0.2150 *** 0.2011 *** 0.2095 *** 0.2396 *** 
   0.0677  0.0717  0.0747  0.0788  0.0684  
dChairit*dFemalei     -0.0624    -0.0611  -0.0567  
     0.1805    0.1808  0.1569  
dChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit+1)       0.0011  0.0010  0.0011  
       0.0060  0.0060  0.0056  
Constant -2.2822 *** -2.3340 *** -2.3375 *** -2.3305 *** -2.3343 *** -1.9217 *** 
 0.4891  0.4880  0.4882  0.4887  0.4889  0.4097  
Number of observations 5922  5922  5922  5922  5922  6478  
Number of scientists 765  765  765  765  765  774  
χ2 279.636  291.453  291.508  291.493  291.536  325.295  
R2 within groups 0.0260  0.0267  0.0267  0.0267  0.0267  0.0381  
R2 overall 0.0688  0.0781  0.0782  0.0781  0.0782  0.0745  
R2 between groups 0.1162  0.1282  0.1284  0.1282  0.1284  0.1121  
 Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, 
and university dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 
7.74, and 12 respectively. The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 625.89 and significant at level of 0.01, implying 
that endogeneity exists. 
 
 
 
